An old history essay from 2022 I found for my Middle Eastern Studies class that I thought was a banger.

The Passive Revolution of 1952

On July 23, 1952, a group of young Egyptian officers, known as the Free Officers, initiated a revolution that seemingly irrevocably altered the landscape of Egypt and the Middle East. Despite lacking a clear plan, their ascension to power dramatically transformed Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rise led to the formulation and popularization of Nasserism, a distinct form of Arab socialism, throughout the Middle East. To many Arabs, the new Egyptian regime appeared to offer a definitive answer to imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Yet, despite its radical facade and revolutionary rhetoric, the class characteristics of the new government remained largely unchanged. Ultimately, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was a passive revolution, as its immense social welfare benefits were eventually co-opted to suppress more radical movements, leading to the creation of a new bourgeoisie and the continuation of old étatist ideologies.

In his Prison Notebooks, the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci defined the fascist passive revolutions of Europe as those in which “the economic structure is transformed in a ‘reformist’ way from an individualistic to a planned economy (command economy). The advent of an ‘intermediate economy’ between the purely individualistic one and the integrally planned one allows the transition to more developed political and cultural forms without radical and destructive cataclysms of an exit meeting kind.” While it would be problematic to label the 1952 Egyptian revolution as fascist, numerous parallels exist between its passive elements and those highlighted by Gramsci. This is because Nasser’s reforms were not fundamentally aimed at initiating radical change but rather at co-opting and neutralizing potential threats from left-wing organizations, thereby enabling their suppression.

This co-optation is most evident in Nasser’s land redistribution program. The issue of land inequality had deeply troubled Egyptian elites and society throughout the 20th century. By 1952, a staggering 0.04% of the Egyptian population owned 35% of the land. Given such profound class contradictions, Egypt was undeniably on the verge of a radical revolution before Nasser’s ascent. However, Nasser’s rise to power offered a saving grace to the Egyptian bourgeoisie. His land reform programs provided just enough concessions to poor and middle-class peasants to placate them without fundamentally disrupting existing class relations. This was achieved through a moderate land reform program that, while certainly weakening the landed aristocracy, did not destroy them. In fact, it cultivated a loyal second elite by redistributing land to middle-class peasants. In this manner, Nasser adeptly co-opted radical elements without destructive changes to Egypt’s pre-existing class characteristics, thereby preventing both the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood from seizing power.

Despite these internal dynamics, Nasser maintained a rather radical public image. In a 1961 speech, he proclaimed, “The wages of the workers were 25% of the profits whereas the few capitalists gained 75%. Is this justice? Is this the law of right, the law of God? Is this Islam?” One could easily mistake Nasser for a Marxist based on such rhetoric. Yet, paradoxically, Marxists were precisely among his primary enemies.

Although Nasserism outwardly appeared immensely radical, the new government seemed most preoccupied with suppressing genuine radical movements. Groups such as the Egyptian Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood faced severe state repression, including death penalties for their leaders and the suppression of all parties outside of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which Nasser controlled. One of the most egregious examples of this suppression was Nasser’s crushing of the 1952 Textile Workers’ strike. The Egyptian military brutally put down striking textile workers who were demanding better rights, clearly signaling early on that the Egyptian government would not tolerate bottom-up change. By engaging in such suppressions, the Nasser government ultimately preserved the existing social fabric of Egyptian society rather than destroying it, opting instead for slow reform through his brand of Arab socialism, consistent with key aspects of passive revolution.

Another significant facet of Nasser’s Arab socialism was nationalization. With Nasser’s nationalization of key Egyptian industries and the implementation of a centrally planned economy, it certainly would have appeared to outsiders that his new regime was following the path of the more radical Marxist-Leninist USSR. However, Nasser’s nationalization, rather than destroying Egypt’s bourgeoisie, instead created a new one comprised of government technocrats. Thus, by incorporating and cultivating a new bourgeoisie within the government rather than eliminating them, Nasser was able to keep the class nature of Egyptian society largely intact, in line with most passive revolutions.

The final key to understanding the 1952 Egyptian Revolution as a passive revolution lies in the economic mode of étatism. Étatism, in many ways, predated Nasser, with its origins in Egyptian society dating back three decades before the 1952 revolution. In 1918, Egypt’s bourgeoisie (mostly businessmen and industrialists) met to discuss solutions for Egypt’s undiversified economy. Having faced several economic crashes and depressions due to Egypt’s heavy reliance on a monoculture-based economy, the Egyptian bourgeoisie ultimately decided upon what would become étatism. They concluded that Egyptian society critically needed industrialization with state assistance, tariff protections for native businesses, and economic nationalism. Nasser would ultimately pursue all of these programs. His rule witnessed the rapid industrialization of Egypt under a government-assisted five-year plan and economic nationalism through an anti-imperialist economic policy, such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the construction of the Aswan Dam, alongside other various foreign-owned businesses. Upon reflection, it quickly becomes evident that Nasser’s government was a clear continuation of the ideology embraced by the industrial and commercial elites of 1918.

In conclusion, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, while leaving an undeniable mark on Egyptian and Middle Eastern history, ultimately failed in many critical aspects. It failed to tear the social fabric, especially the class structure that had preceded it; it failed to remove the bourgeoisie from power; it failed to eliminate the land-holding aristocratic elites; it failed to implement revolutionary change from the bottom up; and finally, it failed to empower the Egyptian proletariat and peasantry. In essence, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was a passive revolution, as it ultimately opted for reforming the old Egyptian political order rather than tearing it apart. What the Egyptian revolution did produce, however, was a government of social welfare. This government, rather than fighting with the peasants and workers to overthrow the old political orders, gave them concessions when they were on the brink of revolutionary ferment. In this way, the laissez-faire economy of Egyptian society was stabilized from a true revolution from below. With this stabilization, Egyptian society was ultimately able to avoid the victory of radical elements like the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood, both organizations that, after having the rug pulled from under them, were subsequently suppressed by the new regime. While Nasserism and Nasser’s political regime may have seemed new, in many ways, it was much older than most realized. The regime continued the interests of the old bourgeoisie and their policies of government-guided industrialization and economic nationalism. On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers sought to save Egypt from the old regime. Yet, with their subsequent rise to power, they became part of the very same regime they overthrew.

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Bibliography

Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009.

Gramsci, Antonio. The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935. Edited by David Forgacs. 1st ed. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000. Accessed via Canvas.

Nasser, Gamal A. “Speech Delivered by President Gamal cAbd al-Nasser at Port Said on the Occasion of Victory Day on 23 December 1961.” In The Modern Middle East: A History, by James L. Gelvin, 327. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. PDF.

Shakry, Omnia E. “Etatism: Theorizing Egypt’s 1952 Revolution.” In The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt, 197-290. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007. Accessed via Canvas